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THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
JAPAN IN THE FIELD OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
Takaaki Hattori*
The Japanese judiciary has evolved only quite recently. The judiciary
came into existence in the modem sense after the so-called Meiji Restoration of 1868, which swept away the feudal governmental system under
the Tokugawa Shogunate. After a series of patchwork reforms, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was finally established in 1889. The Constitution set up a constitutional monarchy based upon a separation of powers theory.' Implementing legislation 2 was passed which created a
modem and unified court structure staffed by trained professionals. This
regime endured without significant change for more than fifty years until
the end of the Second World War.
The prewar separation of powers did not rise to our present day standard, however. It is true that the prewar judiciary of Japan stood quite
steadfast against extra-judicial interference with its decisions, especially
from the executive branch and political circles. The best known example
of judicial independence was the so-called "Otsu case" of 1891,3 which
occurred soon after the enactment of the Constitution of 1889. In May
1891, in the small city of Otsu, a patriotic policeman attempted to murder
the Crown Prince of Russia, later Czar Nicholas II, who was visiting
* B. Jur., Tokyo Imperial University, 1935. Appointed to the bench in 1938; served on the legal
staff of the Ministry of Justice during 1946 and on the legal staff of the General Secretariat of the
Supreme Court, 1947-54. Participant, Japanese American Program for Cooperation in Legal Studies
at Harvard University, 1954-55, and at University of Michigan and Stanford University. 1955-56.
Assigned as an Instructing Officer for Civil Trials to the Legal Training and Research Institute of the
Supreme Court, 1956-59; Judge of Tokyo District Court, 1957-65; Chief Judge of Tsu District and
Family Court, 1966-67; Judge of Tokyo High Court, 1968-71; Chief Judge of Tokyo Family Court,
1972; Chief Judge of Fukuoka High Court, 1973-74; Chief Judge of Osaka High Court, 1975. Appointed Justice of the Japanese Supreme Court in December 1975 and subsequently appointed Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court in April 1979; retired from office in September 1982. Author of CIVIL
PROCEDURE INJAPAN (Matthew Bender, 1983) (D. HENDERSON, co-author); The Legal Profession in
Japan: Its HistoricalDevelopment and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN (Harvard University Press.
1963); BEIKOKO Nt OKERU PRETRIAL OYOBt KAUI NO SEIDO (The Systems of Pretrial and Discovery in the

United States) (1958).
The writer expresses his deepest appreciation to Professor Dan F. Henderson. Director of Asian
Law Program, School of Law, University of Washington, for his kind suggestions and cooperation
during the preparation of this article.
1. See generally 10 JAPANESE CULTURE OF THE MEII ERA, JAPANESE LEGISLATION OF THE MEIJI
EPA (Ishii R. ed., W. Chambliss trans. 1958).
2. The most important is Saibansho K6sei-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 6 of 1890.
3.

See KOJIMA. OTSU JIKEN TENMATSU-ROKU (An Account of the Otsu Case) (1931).
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Japan at the time. The government was afraid of disrupting diplomatic
relations with Russia, and thus urged the responsible judges of the Great
Court of Cassation (the prewar Supreme Court) to impose the death penalty by analogously applying the Penal Code provision for attempted homicide against a member of the Japanese imperial household. 4 The then
Chief Justice Kojima strongly rejected the government's demands on the
ground that attempted homicide against a member of a foreign imperial
family did not fall under the Penal Code provision. The court therefore
imposed only a life imprisonment sentence on the policeman, as was provided in the code for attempted homicide against an ordinary person.
Even so, the prewar judges were beholden to the executive branch to
some extent. They were appointed by the government, 5 and were under
the general supervision of the Minister of Justice, 6 rather than that of the
judiciary itself. Accordingly, there was always the possibility of yielding
to the bureaucratic influence of the Minister of Justice, or indirectly succumbing to political pressure from the government. In addition, an Administrative Court 7 and military courts8 restricted the function of the ordinary courts.
This structure of the judiciary was reformed after the Second World
War by a new constitution. At this time a more complete separation of
powers was instituted and the judicial function was strengthened considerably. Under the Constitution of 1946, which came into effect on May 3,
1947, the courts of Japan were given exclusive judicial power including
the power to review legislative and administrative acts. The 1946 Constitution thus granted to Japanese courts for the first time the power to determine the constitutionality of legislative and administrative acts, 9 similar
to the American practice of judicial review. It has also vested the Supreme Court with rule-making power, which guarantees court autonomy
not only in procedural or judicial areas but also in the field of judicial
administration in general. 10
4. KEIHO (Penal Code), Decree of Great Council of State No. 36 of 1880. art. 116. prescribed as
follows: "Any person who inflicted or attempted to inflict an injury on the Emperor. the Empress or
the Crown Prince shall be punished with death."
5. Under the prewar system, judges, like other government officials, were selected and appointed
by the executive branch based on the appointive power of the Emperor. See KENP6 (Constitution) OF
JAPAN, 1889, art. 10; Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law). Law No. 59 of 1947. art. 67: Naikaku
kansei (Cabinet Organization), Imperial Ordinance No. 135 of 1879, art. 5(l)(vii): Kakusho hansei
tsusoku (General Rules for Organization of Each Ministry). Imperial Ordinance No. 122 of 1893.
6. See Saibansho k6sei-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 6 of 1890. art. 135.
7. See Gy6sei saiban-h6 (Administrative Adjudication Law). Law No. 48 of 1890: Gy6sei saibansho-rei (Administrative Court Ordinance), Imperial Ordinance No. 133 of 1913.
8. See Rikugun gunpo kaigi-h6 (Army Court Martial Law), Law No. 85 of 1921: Kaigun gunp6
kaigi-h6 (Navy Court Martial Law), Law No. 91 of 1921.
9. See KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, arts. 76. 81.
10. Seeid..art.77.

Role of the Supreme Court of Japan
This article focuses on the Japanese Supreme Court's exercise of its
power of judicial administration. The article places special emphasis on
the management of the judiciary and on rulemaking, both quite novel to
the Japanese court.
I. BACKGROUND
Before discussing judicial administration in Japan, I will briefly describe the Japanese court system. There are three important features of the
Japanese judicial system: the organization of courts, the categories of
judges, and the selection of judges.
Under the present Constitution Japan has a unitary judicial system with
five kinds of courts: one Supreme Court;" eight high courts; 12 fifty district courts;' 3 fifty family courts; 14 and 575 summary courts. 15 Summary
courts resemble small claims courts and justice-of-the-peace courts in the
11. See KENo (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 76(1); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 6-8.,
12. See KENfo (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 77(1); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 15-17; Kakyu saibansho no setsuritsu oyobi kankatsu kuiki ni
kansuru h6ritsu (Law Concerning Establishment and Territorial Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts), Law
No. 63 of 1947, art. 1.
There are six branches of high courts throughout Japan. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 22(1); K6to saibansho shibu setchi kisoku (Rules Concerning Establishment of Branches of the High Courts), Supreme Court Rule No. I of 1948.
13. See KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 77(1); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 23-25; Kaky5 saibansho no setsuritsu oyobi kankatsu kuiki ni
kansuru hfritsu (Law Concerning Establishment and Territorial Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts), Law
No. 63 of 1947, art. 1.
There are 242 branch offices of district courts throughout Japan. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 31(1); Chih6 saibansho oyobi katei saibansho shibu setchi
kisoku (Rules Concerning the Establishment of the Branches of District Courts and Family Court),
Supreme Court Rule No. 14 of 1947, art. 1.
14. See KENPO (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 77(1); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 31-2, 31-3; Kaky6i saibansho no setsuritsu oyobi kankatsu kuiki ni
kansurn hfritsu (Law Concerning Establishment and Territorial Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts), Law
No. 63 of 1947, art. 1.
There are 242 branch offices and 96 sub-branch offices of family courts throughout Japan. See
Saibansho-h5 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 31,3 1-5; Chih6 saibansho oyobi
katei saibansho shibu setchi kisoku (Rules Concerning the Establishment of the Branches of District
Courts and Family Court), Supreme Court Rule No. 14 of 1947, art. 1; Katei saibansho shutch6
setchi kisoku (Rules for Establishment of Sub-branch Offices of the Family Court), Supreme Court
Rule No. 32 of 1950.
15. See KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 77(1); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 32-34; Kakyf8 saibansho no setsuritsu oyobi kankatsu kuiki ni
kansuru hfritsu (Law Concerning Establishment and Territorial Jurisdiction of Inferior Courts), Law
No. 63 of 1947, art. 1.
All or a portion of the judicial business of the 58 summary courts designated by the Supreme Court
is temporarily performed by neighboring summary courts in accordance with article 38 of the Court
Organization Law.
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United States; their jurisdiction is limited to civil cases involving 900,000
yen (approximately $4,000) and minor criminal cases. 16 Family courts
are special courts, dealing exclusively with domestic relations and juvenile delinquency cases. 1 7 They occupy the same level in the system as
district courts, and sit in the same cities. District courts are courts of general jurisdiction.' 8 High courts are appellate courts, somewhat similar to
the federal courts of appeals in the United States, although the nature of
both first and second appeals in Japan is quite different from that of the
United States appellate courts. 19
The bench in Japan is classified into five categories of judges (saibankan): (1) the fifteen Supreme Court justices, including the chief justice; (2)
the eight chief judges (presidents) of the high court; (3) about 1350 full
judges (hanji); (4) about 600 assistant judges (hanji-ho); and (5) about
800 summary court judges. 20 The four categories of judges other than
Supreme Court justices are generically called "inferior court judges."21
The distinction between Supreme Court justices and inferior court judges
is noteworthy because the method of selection is quite different.
The judges of Japan, except Supreme Court justices and summary
court judges, are mostly "career judges." Supreme Court justices are appointed in roughly equal numbers from among three broad groups: (1)
inferior court judges; (2) practicing lawyers; and (3) public prosecutors,
22
law professors, or other persons of broad knowledge and experience.
Summary court judges are usually appointed from among: (1) persons
with certain required knowledge and experience; (2) retired inferior court
judges or public prosecutors; and (3) (temporarily or concurrently) assis23
tant judges or full judges.
16.

See Saibansho-h5 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 33. 34.

17.

See id. arts. 24, 25.

18.
19.

See id. art. 31-3.
See id. arts. 16, 17.

However, the character of appeals to the Japanese high courts is quite different from appeals to the
United States appellate courts. On the civil side, appellate proceedings in high courts are treated as a
continuation or reopening of the first instance. See T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN

JAPAN § 8.02 (1983). On the criminal side, high courts review the law or facts as found in judgments
at first instance. See S. DANDO. JAPANESE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 415-17 (J. George trans.

1965).
20. See KENP5 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 79(l); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 5, 15; Saibansho shokuin teiin-h6 (Law for Fixed Number of Court
Officials), Law No. 53 of 1951, art. 1.
21. See KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 80; Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law),
Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 5(2).
22. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 41; see also H. KANEKO & M. TAKESHITA. SAIBAN-HO (Court Organization Law) 208 (1978).

23. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 44, 45.
While the compulsory retirement age is 65 for ordinary inferior court judges and 63 for public
prosecutors, summary court judges may serve until 70. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law),
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Other inferior court judges, in contrast, normally choose their position
as a career. They are appointed assistant judges for a ten-year term after
meeting three requirements. Career judges must graduate from the university (law department), pass the national legal examination, and complete two years of professional training required by law at the Legal
Training and Research Institute, the only national training institution for
24
the entire legal profession.
After at least ten years service as assistant judges, career judges are
usually appointed as full judges for a ten year term. 25 The term is normally renewed 26 so that these judges remain in the judiciary until compulsory retirement at age sixty-five, 27 except for those who may resign earlier for private reasons. They spend most of their lives as judges in a
system much like the United States government civil service, except that
the Japanese judiciary is managed separately by the Supreme Court.
Some judges may be appointed for a few years to administrative positions
with the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, or other governmental
agencies.
This system, commonly called the "career judge" system or the "career judiciary," can be traced to the origins of Japan's prewar judicial
training system. The training system was borrowed from continental
countries, mostly from Germany and France, soon after the Meiji Restoration of 1867.28 The leaders of the Meiji government probably adopted
the career judge system without paying much attention to possible alternatives such as the appointive judge system in effect in England or the
elective system used in the United States. Moreover, the Meiji government may have adopted a career judge system as a matter of course, since
the only training available for judicial officers was in the newly-established law school of the Ministry of Justice and in the law department of
the new university. Jurists and lawyers as trained in modem law simply
did not exist in the early Meiji period. 29 Additionally, the Meiji leaders
may have believed that career judges with long professional training and
much experience in trial work were more suitable to conduct effiLaw No. 59 of 1947, art. 50. Accordingly, retired judges or public prosecutors may be appointed as
summary court judges.
24. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 43, 66, 67; Shiho
shiken-h6 (Legal Examination Law), Law No. 140 of 1949, art. 1.
25. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 42(1).
26. See KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 80(1).
27. See id., art. 80(1); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50.
28.

See E. HAYNES. THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 17 1-77 (1944) (training system for

judges in prewar Germany).
29. See Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan:ItsHistoricalDevelopment andPresentState. in
LAw IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER INA CHANGING SocIEry. 114 n.8 (A. von Mehren, ed. 1963).
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cient civil and criminal trials than short-term elected or appointive judges
with experience from only one side of the bench. Without ajury system in
Japan, the judges bore, or at least were expected to bear, heavier responsibilities in directing hearings and formulating issues, especially for the
many parties who appeared pro se. The judge alone had to complete the
proof-taking, fact-finding, and application of law under the prewar inquisitorial procedure.
Career judges have been criticized as "fossils" or "greenhorns" far
removed from the rough and tumble life in the street and therefore prone
to hand down judgments that are out of touch with the world. 30 Generally, however, it is accepted that prewar judges fulfilled their mission
well and had judicious characters. They were perhaps the most reliable of
the bureaucratic organizations in Japan. 3 1 Thus, the system proved quite
durable and continued without change to the end of World War 11.32
After the war, however, novel proposals were considered. For example, in 1954 the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the professional
organization of practicing lawyers throughout Japan, suggested that all
judges and prosecutors be selected from among the members of the bar
who had practiced for a particular number of years. 33 In 1961 the Japan
Jurist Association, a unique voluntary private organization that brings together certain judges, lawyers, public prosecutors, and law professors.
adopted a similar resolution favoring judicial appointments from the
bar. 34 In response to such proposals, the prestigious Temporary Investigative Commission on the Judicial System, established by the government in 1962, issued a final report after two years of deliberations. It
stated:
The so-called "unification of the legal profession," which means the principle of selecting judges from among senior members of the bar, is a desirable
system also for our country, if it can be smoothly realized. However, the
conditions necessary for its realization have not yet been fully established.

30.

Enkichi Oki. the Minister of Justice from 1920 to 1922. created a major controversy because

he was reported to have made a statement that judges were *'fossils." See 1716 HORITSU SIihMBUN
(The Law News) 21 (1920).
31. See H. KANEKO & M. TAKESHITA. supra note 22. at 58.
32. The procuracy developed a system similar to that for judges. probably for similar reasons.
33.

See H. KANEKO & M. TAKESHITA. supra note 22. at 202.

Professor Kaneko considered this to be an attempt by the lawyers to gain equality to some extent:
they had long complained of discriminatory treatment before World War II. A similar proposal %%as
made by members of the bar before the war. Id. at 339.
Also noteworthy is the lack of any suggestion that judges should be elected. This probably is a
general reflection of the dubious merit of the elective system, especially for Japan.
34. Seeidat 202.
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Accordingly, at this time we should instead plan to improve the present system by taking the merit of the unification system into consideration .... 35

As pointed out in the Commission report, there are many obstacles to a
so-called unified legal profession in Japan. For example, there is a ten36
dency towards professional immobility, traditional to Japanese society.
Also, there may be difficulties resulting from a change of emotional, economic and living environments that may inhibit individuals from initiating a move from bar to bench in mid-career. Thus, the Japanese judiciary,
for better or worse, is still composed mostly of career judges, ds it was
before the new Constitution.
II.

THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT'S POWER OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION

I will now turn to a discussion of judicial administration in Japan. In
particular, I will discuss the management of the judiciary and the Japanese Court's rulemaking power.
A.

Managementof the Judiciary

The Supreme Court's management of the judiciary in Japan entails a
number of responsibilities. Some of the most important include the selection of judges, the assignment of a judge to a specific court, the promotion of judges, and in-service training and supervision of judges.
1.

Selection ofJudges

All Japanese judges are appointed by the cabinet, except the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who is appointed by the Emperor based upon
the nomination of the cabinet. 37 The appointive procedure for Supreme
Court justices is different from that for the inferior court judges.38 The
cabinet has full powers of selection of Supreme Court justices. However,
the prime minister often seeks the opinion of the chief justice, particularly
when the prospective justice is a career judge. Or, the prime minister
35. Id. at 203.
36. It is a well known fact, even in the United States in recent years, that the lifelong employment system is also common in private companies in Japan.
37. See KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, arts. 6(2), 79(1), 80(1); Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 39(1), (2), 40(l).
38. Compare KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, arts. 6(2), 79(1) and Saibansho-h6 (Court
Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 39(l), (2) (appointment of Supreme Court justices),
with KENP6 (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 80(1) and Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law),
Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 40(1) (appointment of inferior court judges).
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may, through the chief justice, seek the opinion of the bar association
when the prospective justice is a lawyer. The prime minister is by no
means bound by such opinion, however. In view of the particular importance of the Supreme Court, the constitution has adopted the doctrine ot
checks and balances, allowing the cabinet discretion in appointment of
the justices. Moreover, the appointment of Supreme Court justices must
be reviewed by the people at the first national election following each
appointment, and once again after a ten-year term. If the majority of voters favor the dismissal of a justice, the justice loses the position automatically. 39 It is said that this system is borrowed from the "'Missouri Plan"
in the United States, under which each justice is reviewed on his record
by the electorate and does not run against other candidates for the position. 40 Thus, since 1947, Japanese justices of the Supreme Court have
been appointed by a system quite different and new to Japan. 4 1
Inferior court judges are appointed by the cabinet from a list of persons
nominated by the Supreme Court. 42 Their tenure is limited to ten years.
with the possibility of reappointment (which usually occurs). 4 3 The Supreme Court prepares separate lists for each category of judges: chief
39. See KENPO (Constitution) OF JAPAN. 1946. art. 79(2). (3). (4): Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law). Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 29(3): see also Saiko saibansho saibankan kokunin shinsa h6
(Supreme Court Justice Popular Review Law). Law No. 136 of 1947.
The Supreme Court held that the system of Supreme Court justice popular review is not designed to
examine whether or not the appointment of the justice itself should be effectuated, but to determine
whether or not the justice appointed should be dismissed. See Sasaki v. Chairman of the Supreme
Court Justice Popular Review Administration Commission. 6 Sai-han minshfi 122 t19521. In all
popular reviews held so far, however. votes for dismissal have barely reached ten to eleven percent of
the total, and no justice has been removed.
40. See Mo CONST art. V. § 29: A. VANDERBILT. MINIMUM STANDARD OF JUDICIAiL ADNtINISTRA
TION 5 (1949).

41. In some Japanese circles, there are arguments against the popular review system based on the
grounds that (I) the public cannot evaluate the activities of a justice because judicial duties require a
high degree of technical competence, and moreover, the public does not have much opportunity to
know the activities of a particular justice, and (2) a considerable expenditure of public funds is
needed to review the justices. nearly all of whom are in no way controversial.
However, in view of the importance of the position of the Supreme Court justices. some kind of
popular participation in their selection may be appropriate. Therefore, the weight of authority seems
to find that an impetuous abolition of this system would be unwise. See Saiko saibansho jimu sokyoku (General Secretariat of the Supreme Court). 2 Saibansho-h6 chikujo kaisetsu (Commentaries on
the Court Organization Law) 29, 30 (1969): H. KANEKO & M. TAKESHITA. supra note 22. at 211.
42. See KENPO (Constitution) OF JAPAN. 1946, art. 80(l): Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 40.
43. See KENPO (Constitution) OF JAPAN. 1946. art. 80(I): Saibansho-ho (Court Organization
Law), Law No. 59 of 1947. art. 40.
Under the prewar system, judges were officials for life. with retirement from actual service set at
the age of 63. It is said that the present system of 10-year terms has been adopted to prevent judges
from becoming idle and complacent because of the security of tenure, expecting rational personnel
management to occur only by the normal processes of metabolism. See H. KANEKO & M. TAKESHITA
supra note 22, at 218.

Role of the Supreme Court of Japan
judges of the high court, judges, assistant judges, and summary court
judges. 44 The cabinet is not allowed to appoint a person not on the list.
Theoretically, it can refuse to appoint persons on the list and require the
Court to submit a new list, but it rarely does so. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in fact has the initiative in selecting inferior court judges.
This fact sustains the "career judiciary" and thus makes the Supreme
Court's responsibility important in selecting, supervising, training, and
continuously educating judges. It is also clear that this- is a constitutional
device to impose an effective check on political appointment by the cabinet, on the one hand, and an indirect check on arbitrariness of the judiciary, on the other hand, by leaving the final step in the appointment to the
cabinet. As a matter of fact, applications from experienced lawyers to
become inferior court judges, though possible, are rare because of the
45
institutional environment described above.
Therefore, the lists of nominees for assistant judges and judges are usually prepared and submitted to the cabinet at the time of graduation from
the Legal Training and Research Institute in April every year. In other
words, a number of new graduates, around seventy in recent years because the vacancies are limited, apply for nomination as assistant judges.
Simultaneously, most of the assistant judges who were appointed in April
ten years earlier become qualified to serve as judges and are usually nominated as judges. They are normally appointed based upon the lists prepared by the Supreme Court. (However, those assistant judges with ten
years of service who were not in actual service for the entire ten years
because of illness or other reasons may not be nominated as candidates
for positions as full judges.)
The selection of summary court judges is similar to that of judges and
assistant judges. Summary court judges are usually nominated and appointed in August of every year, either from among retired judges and
prosecutors, or from among persons who have been selected in June or
July by the Summary Court Judge Selection Committee of the Supreme
46
Court.
In preparing its lists of nominees for inferior court judges, the Supreme
Court is most prudent and cautious about its constitutional responsibility.
44. See Saik6 saibansho jimu sfkyoku (General Secretariat of the Supreme Court), at 204, 205.
45. See H. KANEKO & M. TAKESHITA. supranote 22, at204, 205.
46. This Committee is composed of Supreme Court justices, the Chief Judge of the Tokyo High
Court, the Deputy Procurator General, practicing lawyers, and those with social knowledge and ex-perience. Candidates in this selection process are court clerks who have served for many years, retired government officials, retired business executives, and the like. See Kan'i saibansho hanji senk6
kisoku (Rules Concerning Selection of Judges of the Summary Court), Supreme Court Rule No. 2 of
1947.
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It carefully examines not only whether the applicant satisfies the formal
requirements prescribed by law, but also considers his or her aptitude as a
judge including the applicant's overall personality, personal history. legal
ability, and health. 47 A Supreme Court committee also interviews each
applicant. Every effort is made to recruit the ablest and most promising
persons to the judiciary. When an assistant judge applies for full judgeship, achievements during the ten years of service will also be taken into
consideration. Needless to say, the general practices mentioned above do
not preclude the possibility of casual appointments to fill vacancies occurring from time to time.
2.

Assignments of Judges to ParticularCourts

The next important matter following the appointment of an inferior
court judge is an assignment to a specific court for service. Unlike the
American system, but similar to the system in some continental countries,
all inferior court judges in Japan are appointed without being assigned to
the court where they are to serve. The purpose is to avoid placing a judge
on a specific court throughout his entire tenure, which is thought to hamper efficient personnel administration in the judiciary. 48 Instead, the Supreme Court assigns each new appointee to a specific court immediately
49
after appointment.
Since a judge, whether a judge, assistant judge, or summary court
judge, is usually required to serve for at least two or three years in the
court to which he is assigned, the Supreme Court is careful in making
assignments. The Court considers factors such as the desires of the judge,
his familiarity or acquaintance with the place to be assigned, judicial vacancies, and the volume of business of the specific court. The Court thus
tries to adjust to the interests of both the judge and the court. In assigning
newly appointed assistant judges, the Supreme Court has followed a policy of assigning them to large, medium, and small courts in rotation during their ten-year term, though not necessarily in a fixed order. This is to
allow inexperienced assistant judges to become acquainted with the work
at a variety of courts. This rotation has worked out fairly well so far, with
the cooperation of all concerned. It should be added here that, although
newly appointed judges may theoretically be assigned to any court without their consent, they may not, once assigned, be removed to a different
47. See Saik6 saibansho jimu s6kyoku (General Secretariat of the Supreme Court), at 37.
48. See id. at 104.
49. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 47.
The number of judges to be assigned to each inferior court is determined by the Supreme Court.
This number is changed from time to time after studying the caseload of each court.
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court without their consent. 50 In the case of judges, reassignment or
change of assignment is generally less frequent.
3.

PromotionofJudges

The promotion of judges is related to assignment of judges. Promotion
usually means the transfer of judges from a lower or less important position to a higher or more important position. It also can mean a raise of
judicial salary. 5 1 Since the Japanese judiciary is composed of career
judges, promotion is usual for younger judges of some talent. A judge's
transfer from one court to another is legally a change of assignment, even
if it is done for the purpose of promotion. Therefore, such transfer must
be determined by the Supreme Court with the consent of the judge concerned. 52 A raise of a judge's salary is also determined by the Supreme
Court. 53 Other kinds of promotion are determined, as appropriate, either
by the Supreme Court or by the judges' conference of the court to which
the judge concerned has been assigned.
Generally, a judge commences his or her career as an assistant judge
immediately after graduation from the Legal Training and Research Institute. 54 The judge will probably first be assigned to a district court to serve
as a junior associate judge of one division, as part of a three-judge bench
which usually deals with cases too difficult or complex to be handled by a
single-judge bench. 55 If the assistant judge has served for five years or
more without serious trouble, he or she may then be designated as a "specially-qualified assistant judge" by the Supreme Court. The assistant
judge can then hear and try cases alone, like a full judge, under the au50. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 48.
51. In Japan, while the salaries of the Supreme Court justices and chiefjudges of the high courts
are, roughly speaking, uniformly fixed for each categoy, the salaries of full judges, assistant judges,
and summary court judges are individually determined in accordance with a salary schedule prescribed by law. For example, there are nine grades in the salary schedule for full judges. See Saibankan no hflshfi nado ni kansuru hflritsu (Law Concerning Compensation of Judges, etc.), Law No.75
of 1948.
In addition to their monthly salary, all judges receive special monthly allowances of about 8% of
their monthly base salary, and extra bonuses two or three times a year, up to a total of about one-third
of their annual salary.
It is one of the important administrative functions of the Supreme Court to grade the individual
judge appropriately, taking into account factors such as his age, length of service, ability, achievement and the like.
52. Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 47,48.
53. Saibankan no hfshfi nado ni kansur h6ritsu (Law Concerning Compensation of Judges,
etc.), art. 3 (1948).
54. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 43.
55. The Court Organization Law provides that assistant judges cannot hear or try cases alone but
can be members of a collegiate body (a division or a three-judge bench). See id., arts. 26, 27.
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thority of a special temporary law. 56 After an assistant judge has com57
pleted ten years of service, he or she is qualified to become a full judge.
If a full judge has been appointed and serves for several years, he or she
may then be assigned as a presiding judge of a division of a district court
or a family court, or as a junior member of a divison of a high court.
Specially talented judges may later be assigned to become the chief judge
of a district court or family court, or the presiding judge of a division of
the high court. Only a few excellent and fortunate people will be able to
reach the position of the chief judge of a high court near the end of their
entire career. Promotions are based mainly on the ability and achievement
of the judge concerned. The opinions of a judge's seniors and colleagues
may also be given consideration. Since summary court judges serve only
on the summary court bench, there are no complex problems concerning
assignments and promotions, as in the case of assistant judges and full
judges.
Reassignments and promotions are often accompanied by a change of
the place of service. Such changes are not only inconvenient to the judges
concerned, but are also inefficient in handling judicial business because
the judges must be changed during the trial of particular cases. 58 However, such disadvantages are inevitable in the career judge system.
Knowledge, ability, and skill of individual judges develop with the passage of time, and the assignment of the right judge to the right position is
required for efficient and effective administration of justice. Moreover,
judges can learn more through experience in various positions and courts,
and through change of work may also refresh themselves and promote
efficiency. The Supreme Court's concern is to make reassignments and
promotions with minimum disadvantages.
4.

In-Service Training of Judges

In view of its great responsibility in the selection, assignment, and promotion of judges, and in response to the proposal of the Temporary Investigative Commission, the Supreme Court has paid special attention to the
so-called in-service training of judges. The prevalence of in-service training in private enterprises and the advocacy of continuing legal education
in the United States has also served as incentive to such efforts.
56. See Hanjiho no shokken no tokurei nado ni kansuru h6ritsu (Law Concerning Special Measures of Authorities of Assistant Judges, etc.), Law No. 146 of 1948, art. 1.
57. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law). Law No. 59 of 1947. art. 42(l).
58. This is particularly true on the civil side because generally Japanese courts do not wait to
commence a second case until after an earlier case has been finally decided. Rather, the court usually
hears several different cases simultaneously on a piecemeal or installment basis. See T. HATrORI &
D. HENDERSON. supra note 19 § 7.04(2).

Role of the Supreme Court of Japan
The most important task of the judiciary is the training of younger,
inexperienced assistant judges. In addition to the daily training of junior
members of a three-judge bench through hearing and trying court cases,
the training for assistant judges is roughly divided into five programs. The
first is a comparatively short introductory course given to assistant judges
immediately after their appointment. Its purpose is to provide them with a
general idea of their future work and to aid them in preparing for judicial
service. The other four training programs are seminar-type programs
given in the first, third, fourth, and ninth years after appointment. The
purpose of these seminars is to prepare the judges for new assignments, or
for nominations to become "specially-qualified assistant judges" or full
judges. In these programs, judges receive advanced knowledge in-special
fields of law, skills needed for conducting trials, and a general understanding of law-related sciences. Exchange of opinions with members of
other branches of the legal professions is also encouraged in these programs.
Apart from these training programs, which are applicable to all assistant judges, a few promising assistant judges are sent to the United States,
England, France, and West Germany every year for comparative study of
law and legal systems. Their studies have made a great contribution to the
Japanese judiciary. In this regard, we would like to express our deep gratitude to the University of Washington and other universities ,and institutions for their kind cooperation for many long years.
The purpose of training for full judges is somewhat different than that
for assistant judges. The first category of training is a short-term colloquium-type program on subjects of current or special importance. The
second is seminars or conferences on the-management of court business,
the education of younger judges, and the like. The third includes research
programs related to special legal problems such as taxation, labor relations, and corporate reorganization. As a part of the second or third program, every year the Supreme Court provides a few judges with the opportunity to make trips abroad to observe the legal system in other
jurisdictions. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recently., created a
training program outside the judiciary. The Court sends a few comparatively young judges to public or private corporations for field study Qf
business transactions and business management for about two months. In
the training of summary court judges, many of whom are selected from
mature, non-lawyer candidates, the study of legal problems and courtroom practice is emphasized.
In addition to these training programs, the Supreme Court holds national and regional conferences for representatives of all courts several
times a year, for the purpose of improving the administration of justice in
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general. In these conferences, judges discuss the interpretation of new
legislation, selected legal or practical problems, devices for expediting
trials, and similar issues. Discussions or opinions expressed in the conferences never bind the judges present, but serve as guides in performing
judicial duties.
5.

AdministrativeSupervision of Judges

The administrative supervision of judges is not under the exclusive
control of the judiciary. If a judge seriously violates his or her professional duties, grossly neglects these duties, or commits, inside or outside
the office, a misdemeanor that gravely impugns integrity as a judge, he or
she may be dismissed by the Judge Impeachment Court composed of Diet
members. 59 Also, a judge who violates or neglects his or her duties or
commits a misdemeanor inconsistent with the integrity of a judge may be
disciplined by a disciplinary court composed of judges. 60 These matters
are outside the ambit of the Supreme Court as an organ of judicial administration.
In the exercise of judicial administrative functions, however, if the Supreme Court finds grounds for dismissal for a certain judge, it must require the Judge Indictment Committee of the Diet to indict the judge. 6 1
Also, the Supreme Court, in a judicial rather than administrative capacity, acts as the court of first and final instance in internal disciplinary
cases involving Supreme Court justices and high court judges. The Supreme Court is the court of final appeal in judicial disciplinary cases in62
volving judges of the inferior courts other than high courts.
In addition, the Supreme Court has been vested with general administrative and supervisory power over all judges in Japan. 63 There is a potential conflict here between the judges' independence to decide cases and
the Supreme Court's power of administrative supervision. The generally
accepted standard is that, while the Supreme Court is not allowed to order
a judge to do or not to do something in connection with a case before him
upon the pretext of administrative supervision, 64 it may issue general instructions to judges with regard to the disposition of judicial business as a
59.

See Saibankan dangai-h6 (Law of Impeachment of Judges), Law No. 137 of 1947, art. I.

The Impeachment Court is composed of Diet members, seven from the House of Representatives
and seven from the House of Councillors. See id. art. 16(1).
60. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 49: Saibankan bungen-h6 (Judge Disciplinary Law), Law No. 127 of 1947, arts. 3, 4, 8.
61. See Saibankan dangai-h6 (Law of Impeachment of Judges). Law No. 137 of 1947. art. 15(3).
62. See Saibankan bungen-h6 (Judge Disciplinary Law), Law No. 127 of 1947. art. 3(2).
63. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law). Law No. 59 of 1947. art. 80.
64.

See id. art. 81.

Role of the Supreme Court of Japan
whole. If a judge ignores such instruction, then the Court may take mea65
sures appropriate for the situation.
B.

Rulemaking Power of the Supreme CourtofJapan

Another important role of the Supreme Court in the field of judicial
administration is the exercise of rulemaking power, newly conferred-upon
it by the Constitution of 1946. The-prewar Supreme Court had no power
to make court rules under the then-existing system. It could prescribe regulations for handling its own business; they were, however, only enforceable with the permission of the minister of justice. Such regulations were
quite different from the court rules envisaged under thepostwar rulemak66
ing power.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has been vested by the Constitution
with rulemaking power with regard to procedure and practice, matters
relating to attorneys, internal discipline of courts, and the administration
of judicial affairs. 67 Since such power was quite unknown to most Japanese jurists at the time the Constitution was enacted, there were heated
discussions among judges, lawyers, and legal scholars 'with regard to the
scope of the subject matter appropriate to such court rules, and the priority between court rules and statutes. As to the former, it is generally considered that, even though procedural in a sense, matters relating to the
protection of the accused, the organization and jurisdiction of the courts,
party capacity and the like should not be governed by court rules. These
matters directly affect the rights or obligations of the parties concerned or
the general public, and therefore must be determined by statute through
legislative representatives. 68 As to tie latter, some people have Strongly
contended, citing Wigmore's theory, that court rules have priority over
statutes so long as the matters fall within the scope prescribed in the constitution. 69 Others have insisted on statutory priority, relying on the
65. See Saik6 saibansho jimu sdkyoku (General Secretariat of the Supreme Court); 3 Saibanshoh6 chikujo kaisetsu (Commentaries on the Court Law), 126, 127, 158-61 (1969); H. KANEKO & M.
TAKESHnTA, supranote 22, at 122, 123.
These measures include, inter alia, a warning not accompanied by a sanction. (because sanctions
may be imposed against judges only through a disciplinary procedure) by the Chief Justice to the
judge concerned, or taking measures necessary for the commencement of disciplinary procedures
against the judge concerned.
66. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 6 of 1890, art: 125(3).
67. See KENPO (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 77.
68. See Saik6 saibanshojimu s6kyoku (General Secretariat of The Supreme Court); 1 Saibanshoh6 chikujo kaisetsu (Commentaries on the Court Law), 62, 63 (1969); see also H. KANEKO & M.
TAKEsITrA, supranote 22, at 112, 113.
69. See Wigmore, Legislature Has No Power in ProceduralField, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 159
(1936); Wigmore, All LegislativeRulesfor JudiciaryProcedureAre Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L.
REv. 276 (1928).
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Constitutional provision which declares the Diet to be the highest and the
sole lawmaking organ. 70 The latter seems to be the prevailing opinion
recently, 7 1 even though the Supreme Court itself has not yet clearly ruled
on the matter. 72 In practice, however, the Supreme Court is quite active
in exercising its rulemaking power, particularly with regard to internal
matters of the courts, which include important issues regarding the workings of a career judiciary. In addition to rulemaking vested in the Court by
the Constitution, some rulemaking has been delegated to the Court by
statutes. While a portion of the current Supreme Court rules (totalling

approximately 150) are of a minor or supplementary nature, others contain
quite substantial and important provisions. 73 Thus, court rules now constitute one of the important sources of law in Japan, and no one can deal
with legal problems properly without consulting the court rules.
The Supreme Court makes its rules at the conference of all of the justices. 74 When prescribing rules of some importance, the Supreme Court
usually hears the opinions of the Supreme Court Civil, Criminal, Family
or General Rules Consultative Committees consisting of judges, lawyers,
75
government officials, law professors, and other knowledgeable persons.
Rules are generally promulgated in the Official Gazette and become ef76
fective after twenty days unless another date is prescribed.

70.

See KENPO (Constitution) OF JAPAN, 1946, art. 41.

71.

See Saik6 saibansho jimu s6kyoku (General Secretariat of The Supreme Court). at 64; H.

KANEKO & M. TAKESHITA. supranote 22, at 117.

72. However, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
The defendant's counsel contends that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are
unconstitutional and hence void because they violate Article 77 of the Constitution providing
that matters relating to procedure must be prescribed by Supreme Court rules. However. it is the
precedent of this Court that the delegation to the Supreme Court by the statute of power to
provide procedural rules is not prohibited by the Constitution. See Shimazaki v. Japan, 4 KEISHt
(SUP. CT., 2d G.B., P.B., Oct. 25, 1950). This judgment presupposes that criminal procedure
can be prescribed by statute. Accordingly, it is clear that the Code of Criminal Procedure is
constitutional.
Sato v. Japan, 9 Sai-han keishOi 911 (1955).
73. As of Oct. 1, 1983, the number of the Supreme Court rules in force is as follows:
(1) Rules relating to procedure ......... 55
(2) Rules relating to attorneys .......... 2
(3) Rules relating to internal matters .. 93.
74. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12: see also Saik6
saibansho jimu srkyoku (General Secretariat of The Supreme Court), at 63.
75. See Saik6 saibansho kisoku seitei shimon iinkai kisoku (Rule Concerning the Supreme Court
Rules Determination Consultative Committee), Supreme Court Rule No. 8 of 1947.
76. See Saibansho kobun hrshiki kisoku (The Rules Concerning the Official Court Documents),
Supreme Court, Rule No. I of 1947, arts. 2, 3.
However, minor and purely internal rules that do not affect the general public (they are called kitei.
as distinguished from other rules, kisoku) are not promulgated, but announced to court officials
through the official court news. Their effective date is prescribed in the rule itself.

Role of the Supreme Court of Japan
One problem still exists, however, with respect to rulemaking by the
Supreme Court. In Japan, many procedural laws were passed before the
promulgation of the present Constitution and many of them are still in
effect. Accordingly, court rules have been used to adjust these laws to the
1947 Constitution. A similar problem has on occasion arisen with recent
legislation. Thus, the distinction in the procedural system between laws
and rules may seem confusing, and may well be inconsonant with the
Constitution. It is a problem still unsolved. One possible solution would
be to have the legislature refrain from making statutes with regard to matters that could be as well prescribed by the court through the exercise of
77
its rulemaking power.
Finally, it should be added that, in view of the quality and quantity of
the Supreme Court's administrative function under the Constitution of
1946, the Court Organizational Law enacted in 1947 has provided a detailed institutional framework of the judiciary consisterit with the new
Constitution. First, the court rules have provided that the administrative
power of the Court must be exercised only through determinations at the
conference of all justices, in order to avoid willfulness or partiality,
which might be possible if administration were left to the chief justice or a
few justices. 78 Only minor or routine matters are entrusted to the chief
justice or one or more justices. 79 The conference is held regularly on every Wednesday. The chief justice is always responsible for executing the
conference's determinations.
Second, for the purpose of assisting the Court or the chief justice in the
exercise of administrative powers, a special organization called the
"General Secretariat of the Supreme Court" has been created by the
Court Organizational Law. 80 It consists of one secretary general, chiefs of
seven bureaus, and about 800 officials including those in charge of court
finance and courthouse construction and maintenance (which are also in
the hands of the Supreme Court). 81 Some of these officials, including the
secretary general, are judges assigned temporarily from inferior courts,
unlike most court administrators in the United States. The Secretariat

77.

See Saik6 saibansho jimu s6kyoku, (General Secretariat of the Supreme Court), at 64; H.

KANEKO & M. TAKESHrrA, supranote 22, at 117.

78. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12; see also Saik6
saibansho saibankan kaigi kitei (Rules for Supreme Court Justices Conference), Supreme Court Rule
(kitel) No. I of 1947.
79. See Saik6 saibansho saibankan kaigi kitei (Rules for Supreme Court Justices Conference),
Supreme Court Rule (kitei) No. I of 1947, art. 7.
80. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 13.
81. Id. art. 53; Saik6 saibansho jimu s6kyoku (General Secretariat of the Supreme Court),
Kisoku (Rule No. 10 of 1947).
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needs such talent because it is also responsible for drafting court rules and
making suggestions for new legislation regarding judicial business.
Third, educational and training institutions for the judiciary are attached to the Supreme Court. The institutions include: (1) the Legal
Training and Research Institute, which is in charge of not only judges but
all candidates for the bar and procuracy; 82 (2) the Training and Research
Institute for Court Clerks;8 3 and (3) the Training and Research Institute
for Family Court Research Officials, that is, family court caseworkers or
84
probation officers.
III.

CONCLUSION

I have roughly described a few features of the Japanese Supreme
Court's power of judicial administration under the Constitution of 1946.
The Court has made a strenuous effort in the past three decades or so to
realize the ideals of an independent judiciary embodied in the new Constitution. It is true that the Supreme Court has not escaped some criticism.
However, no one will deny that the present system of judicial autonomy
as it has recently evolved is far superior to the prewar system in which the
judiciary was under the general supervision of the minister of justice.
The present system of judicial administration is, so to speak, a sapling
which was first cultivated in the Anglo-American tradition. The Japanese
Constitution of 1946 has transplanted that tradition to Japanese soil,
which had been nurturing a Continental Code and judicial system for
more than a century. It is natural to expect that some years and careful
cultivation may be needed to make such a transplant grow strong in a
different climate.
The postwar legal reform in Japan, including the features that I mentioned here, is an extraordinary undertaking in the history of comparative
law. Impetuous or shortsighted judgments about the result are inappropriate and misleading. It is hoped that the Supreme Court of Japan, the Japanese legal profession, and the Japanese people in general will, through
patient and enduring efforts and cooperation, guide this great undertaking
to its fullest fruition in the interest of justice and human rights.
82. See Saibansho-h6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 14.
This Institute is responsible for both the continuing education and research programs for judges and
the training of apprentices for all of the legal professions. These two functions are carried out by the
Institute's first and second divisions, respectively. See Shih6 kenshO-sho kitei (Rules for the Legal
Training and Research Institute), Supreme Court Rule (kitei) No. 6 of 1947.
This Institute was initially designed to train other court officials as well, but training of other court
officials was later transferred to the jurisdiction of the Training and Research Institute for Court
Clerks.
83.
84.

See Saibansho-ho (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 14-2.
See id., art. 14-3.

